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Although this paper was largely written in coffee shops and libraries, my idea for this
project originated from my lived experience with sport. In the next sixty-some pages, I will argue
that sports communicate messages that are not any different than those found in books,
paintings, or oral stories. My time studying abroad and running in Santiago, Chile, taught me
this important lesson. With only a few years of Spanish instruction prior to arriving in Chile, I
often found myself feeling incapable of expressing myself fully to the people I met there. This all
changed when I joined a Chilean club track and field team, el Pacífico, and began regularly
practicing with them. Through sprint workouts and endurance circuits, my body was able to
communicate what my words often could not. As we became more comfortable with each other,
my teammates and I went from discussing our personal records to our personal lives, and
practice turned into a daily exchange of culture and knowledge. Our shared passion for running
overcame linguistic and cultural barriers, allowing me to form lasting friendships and a deeper
understanding of the country.
This paper is dedicated to my teammates of el Pacífico, as well as to the Sepúlveda
Sandoval family, who showed me the kind of warmth and welcome that can never be repaid, only
paid forward. It is from them that I learned a little bit of the language that I will introduce in this
paper.
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Introduction
Sport, like any other performance, is a message. In the same way that literary scholars
carefully attend to the most minute details of language in a passage, the ebb and flow of a race
and the taps and touches of a soccer ball invite the close scrutiny of sports scholars. The stories
that sports tell are open to the interpretation of spectators, coaches, referees, other athletes,
politicians, and journalists, among others. When an athlete competes, their performance is
subject to the appraisal of a variety of these actors, who imbue their play with meaning that the
athlete may not have intended. One person’s interpretation of a sport competition is often at odds
with another’s, and these conflicting storylines clash as the “true story” is sought to be recorded
and remembered. In examining these struggles for meaning, we stand to learn more about not
only the sporting event in question, but about the place and people it represents.
By recognizing that sport is a message and dedicating ourselves to its interpretation, we
can better understand the motives and values of those who are fluent in its language. In this
thesis, I examine several moments in Chilean history where sport communicated messages. To
unpack these messages, I will study the actors in these sporting situations – the athletes, coaches,
spectators, and reporters – and discuss the identities and motives of each. I will then look for
linkages between these sporting moments and ideological movements happening within Chile
and in the world. There is a dominant current that I would like for you to settle in with for the
next fifty-some pages: sport is a language, a vehicle for transmitting messages that can be
unpacked, translated, and interpreted in a variety of ways. The messages that I will examine
primarily focus on questions of Chilean identity, or la chilenidad, and I will argue that sport has
been used to project different dimensions of this identity both domestically and abroad. I will
contend that sport is a viable lens for understanding the nation of Chile, offering new
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perspectives on both overpicked and overlooked swaths of history. As is the case with most
essays that dare to address sport in an academic setting, this will also serve as an argument for
the continued study and inclusion of sports within the realm of area studies, in order to unravel
and appreciate the political, social, and cultural significance that sport so often carries.
I will begin by summarizing the past and present state of sport studies in Chile, in order
to contextualize the current priorities of the field as well as the limitations for an undergraduate
scholar conducting research on this subject from afar. I will then offer a brief crash-course on the
history of sport in Chile and outline major themes that have emerged over time in the national
discourse and policy surrounding sport. From there, I will arrive at the heart of the thesis. I will
examine three select events in Chilean sport history and seek to evaluate their varied meanings
and the significance of the struggles waged over these meanings.
Sports Studies in Chile
The meeting of Latin American studies and sports studies is like that of a blind date
arranged by an overly eager mutual friend. Although the two share many commonalities as
academic disciplines, their first meeting is still clumsy and uncomfortable. Sports studies, like
Latin American studies, is often constrained by scholars’ desire to hone in on specific social
phenomena or sensational topics. For sport studies, academics are drawn to structural examples
of sports as politics, looking at Tommy Smith and John Carlos’ “Black Power” salute and the
recent protests in the National Football League. In Latin American studies, and specifically
within Chile, academics are encouraged to focus on set periods of time like the golpe de estado
and Pinochet dictatorship. In my literature review for this project, I often came across abstracts
that promised to deliver new and illuminating perspectives on the events of military regime;
however, these papers tended to hastily mention the dictatorship in the conclusions of their
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arguments with little convincing explanation for its inclusion. While there is a wealth of
literature on political activism in sports and on lasting effects of the Pinochet regime, other topics
are overlooked and underfunded in these fields of studies.
In a review of the state of sociocultural studies in sport in Latin America, researcher
Miguel Cornejo highlights several challenges that the discipline faces. The dominating English
culture within scholarly work, in addition to the difficulty of accessing key primary sources and
documents for scholars physically outside of the region, has hindered the discipline’s expansion.
However, despite these linguistic and geographic limitations, recent developments in sports
studies within Latin America can be credited to the formation of the Latin American Association
of Sociocultural Studies in Sport (ALESDE) in 2007.1 The association dedicates space and time
to discuss sport as it pertains to Latin America in biennial congresses, and has sponsored and
supported research in this area.2 The lack of credibility frequently associated with sport studies
has also placed it on the periphery of other academic fields, often situated as an afterthought or
elective course in disciplines like physical education or sociology.3 In his book “Soccer in Sun
and Shadow,” Eduardo Galeano sums up this legitimacy issue in a question he poses and answers
himself: “How is soccer like God? Each inspires devotion from believers and mistrust from
intellectuals.”4 Hopefully, this paper can convert at least a few wayward academic souls to the
side of rowdy stadiums and exuberant sprints to the finish line; I can assure you that it is much
more interesting than the purgatory that stuffy libraries and never-ending scholarly conferences
promise.
1

Miguel Améstica Cornejo, “Assessing the Sociology of Sport: On the Latin American Association of Sociocultural
Studies in Sport and Research Development in Latin America,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport
(2015).
2
Cornejo 408.
3
Cornejo 409.
4
Eduardo Galeano, Soccer in Sun and Shadow (Verso, 1998) 33.
.
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By analyzing specific events and social movements linked to sport in Chile, this paper
will demonstrate how sport has served as a site for struggles over the ideals of chilenidad and of
the country as a whole. This will first be put to the test in the case of Manuel Plaza, the first
Chilean athlete to win an Olympic medal, doing so in the marathon race. Plaza’s success at the
1928 Olympics marked the first major international sporting achievement by a Chilean athlete.
This event was used to denote the entrance of Chile into the modernized and Western world by
conflating the ideals and accomplishments of Manuel Plaza with the ideals and accomplishments
of his country. I will also evaluate how Plaza’s image as an athlete was molded in order to fit the
version of chilenidad that his country wished to project to the world.
From there, I will examine the Chile vs. USSR fútbol match in the preliminary qualifying
round of the 1974 World Cup. The Chile vs. USSR match represented the gross display of
complicity in human rights violations to some, while it stood for the success of neoliberalism and
banishment of communism to others. We will use this game, in addition to sport concepts and
rhetoric, as a tool to explore the transition from Salvador Allende’s socialist government to the
military junta beginning in 1973. This section is identified by the struggle between different
sections of Chilean society to create and monopolize the master narrative of the events that took
place following the golpe de estado.
Finally, I will conclude my argument with musings on Chile’s National Stadium. The
National Stadium is perhaps the most exhausted sporting symbol in Chile. It was constructed on
the promises of President Alessandri in 1938, broken by the horrors of General Pinochet’s
regime in 1973, and re-modeled by the people of Chile in the decades that followed in order to fit
the needs of the country as it struggled to reconcile the downfall and then restoration of
democracy. Through analysis of these three moments, the 1928 marathon, 1973 Chile vs. USSR
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game, and the National Stadium’s lifespan, I will demonstrate how sport was used as a
battleground to propagate conflicting narratives and ideas about Chile as a country. Through
these examples, I hope to call attention to “the fact that sport is what we might call a ‘contested
terrain,’ a site where politics is at play, where destructive and damaging influences reside, but
where we also find moments of political resistance, creativity, and human emotions of joy, hope,
and excitement.”5 Drawing upon these various historical, political, and literary frameworks, this
project ultimately advocates for the continued study of sport within the field of area studies, as a
rich source of cultural, political and social significance.
Sport in Chile
Chile declared independence from the Spanish Empire on September 18th of 1810,
successfully seceding in February of 1818. However, the diffusion of modern sports in Chile
began with the arrival of British immigrants in the mid 1800’s. These new sports were heavily
influenced by British culture, and included sports like cricket and rugby. By end of the 19th
century, fútbol, track and field, and tennis had also gained popularity in the country. Chile was
the second Latin American country, after Argentina, to create a national governing body for its
fútbol leagues in 1895. The early institutionalization of modern sports enabled Chile to be the
first and only Latin American country to take part in the first modern Olympic Games in Athens
in 1896.6 To date, Chile has won a total of nine medals in Olympic competition. Notable
Olympians of the country include Manuel Plaza, winner of Chile’s first Olympic medal at the
1928 Games, Raquel Martínez, the first female Chilean athlete to compete at the Olympics in

5

Ben Carrington and David Andrews, “Introduction: Sport as Escape, Struggle and Art,” A Companion to Sport
(Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2013) 19.
6
Gonzalo Bravo, Miguel Cornejo, and Carlos Matus, “Physical Education and After-School Sport Programs in
Chile: The Role of Public and Private Structures,” Global Perspectives on Physical Education and After-School
Sport Programs (University Press of America, 1993) 188.
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1936, and most recently the tennis duo of Nicolás Massú and Fernando González, who added a
collection of four medals in Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008.7
Sport in Chile has undergone a series of changes throughout the years, and understanding
the characteristics of Chilean sport will be important in order to contextualize the specific case
studies that we will examine later on in the paper. The rise of mass culture in the 1920s, which
also popularized fútbol with the inclusion of the working class in sport, brought with it a fierce
divide between amateur and professional players. Amateur players, who mainly came from the
working class, accurately predicted that professionalism in fútbol would disproportionately
siphon away government funding away to professional fútbol associations, further decreasing
access for non-professional teams to the already over-booked canchas.8 They also feared the
diminishment of the community that had formed in the working class fútbol associations by
creating financial incentives for players to leave their neighborhood barrio teams. Amateurism
was viewed as the pure form of sport, and athletes who ventured into the professional realm were
often scorned by the general public, who perceived monetary transactions in sport as threatening
to the moral values and sense of civic duty that sport promised to foster. The politics of
amateurism continued to be disputed through the 1920s and 30s, which we will see later on in the
case of Manuel Plaza.
In terms of national policy, sport in Chile has historically been paired with physical
education and military initiatives. It was not until 2001 that the Ministry of Sport was separated
from its parent branch, the Ministry of Defense.9 These linkages point to the function of sport as

7

“Chile - National Olympic Committee,” International Olympic Committee.
Massú won gold in singles, and doubles with González in 2004. González won bronze in singles in 2004, and silver
in 2008.
8
Brenda Elsey, Citizens and Sportsmen: Fútbol and Politics in Twentieth-Century Chile (University of Texas Press,
2012) 88.
9
Bravo and Cornejo and Matus 191.
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an educational tool, as well as a training ground for potential defenders of the country. These two
purposes often overlapped; in the 1930s, government funding for physical education was
primarily invested in instruction of horseback riding and marksmanship, as one goal of physical
education as a way to “train young men to ‘successfully defend the motherland.’”10 Particularly
after World War I and II, we see an urgency within the rhetoric used by military personnel to use
physical education as a means of developing the masculine bodies of the country, relating
athletic fitness to a matter of national security.11 In 1938, legislators who successfully argued for
the construction of the National Stadium did so by emphasizing that “sport developed masculine
traits, including independence, initiative, and vigor, essential qualities for the ideal citizen.”12
This preoccupation with developing physically fit men reveals the desire of Chilean government
and military agencies to use sport to project a specific image of Chile as a nation of strong and
highly moral men.
With all of this talk of men, masculinity, and male bodies, you may have noticed that
women were virtually excluded from these discussions of the benefits of sport and sport
facilities. Femininity was seen as the antithesis of strength and willpower, traits needed in order
to be successful in athletics. During the national fútbol team’s losing streak in the 1950s,
journalists criticized the footballer’s “effeminate” qualities and blamed the team’s failures on a
masculinity crisis created by the emerging acceptance of women in sport.13 Although most
amateur clubs supported female footballers and female participation in sport steadily rose
through the 1950s and 60s, the national rhetoric surrounding sport largely diminished the role of
women in this realm. Brenda Elsey, an expert on Chilean fútbol associations, concisely

10

Elsey 36.
Elsey 82.
12
Elsey 94.
13
Elsey 19.
11
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summarizes, “[journalistic] analyses equated femininity with indecisiveness and weakness;
therefore, while women may have benefited from football, they had nothing valuable to
contribute.”14 Men were charged with the active role of sustaining Chile’s ethos through the
practice of good sportsmanship and success in sport, both domestically and abroad. Meanwhile,
women held a passive role and non-reciprocal relationship with sport, seen as capable of being
impacted by sport but not of enacting change on it in return.
Race also plays a role in the construction of a master narrative about Chilean sport. This
is most obviously visible in the advertisements used for the 1962 World Cup in Santiago.
Advertisements about the host country described Chileans as, “White, of European heritage;
without a population of color or mixes, the population is the most homogenous in the
Americas.’”15 Sportswriters frequently cited Chile’s European roots as a way of differentiating
the Chilean fútbol team from other South American teams, and accounted for the success of the
Argentine and Brazilian teams by criticizing their style of play as “flashy and individualistic.”16
From this overview of sport in Chile, several themes emerge: most notably, the
attribution of success in sport to the presence of different social categories and signifiers, namely
masculinity, whiteness, and high social class. As I delve into the three case studies of significant
moments in Chilean sport history, the themes of gender, race, and social class will emerge and
manifest themselves in different ways. How was chilenidad constructed from these signifiers,
and why were specific versions of chilenidad broadcast within Chile and internationally? By
deconstructing messages of chilenidad found in sport, we will be able to assemble a
comprehensive image of distinct, and at times discordant, beliefs about Chilean identity in the
1920s and 1970s through 1980s.
14

Elsey 193.
Elsey 127.
16
Elsey 132.
15

Drafts-Johnson 11

Chapter One: Manuel Plaza, Chile’s Silver Medaled Golden Boy
As the dust settled following the end of the first World War in 1918, a global
consciousness began to awaken for many countries, including Chile. Instability in the nitrate
trade, Chile’s main export, spurred on the country’s need to find footing in the global arena. The
1920s in Chile were marked with political strife, first with a deadlocked Congress that led to a
military coup that removed then President Arturo Alessandri.17 As the economic and political
situation wavered, the emerging success of athlete Manuel Plaza appeared even more valuable as
a symbol to unify the country and settle the insecurity felt both domestically and internationally.
Manuel Plaza was born in 1900 and began competing at sixteen years of age in long
distance races. The 1920s were when Plaza began make his mark in the history books as one of
the best South American distance runners of all time. At the 1920 South American
Championships in Santiago, Plaza came in third in the 5,000 meter race and second in the 10,000
meter race. In the 1924 Championships in Buenos Aires, Plaza completely dominated the
distance events, taking first place in the 3,000 meter, 5,000 meter, 10,000 meter, and crosscountry races. Plaza competed in his first Olympic race at the Paris games in 1924, finishing in
sixth place. Today, Manuel Plaza is heralded as one of the founding fathers of track and field in
Chile, and celebrated as one of the most influential athletes of all time in the country. This
recognition largely comes from Plaza’s race at the 1928 Olympic Games in Amsterdam, where
Plaza won Chile’s first Olympic medal by taking second place in the marathon.
Plaza rose to fame at a critical point in Chilean sport history, as Chile and the rest of
South America welcomed development in modern sports to show “that they had embraced the

17

Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, “Chapter Four – Chile,” Modern Latin America (Oxford University
Press, 2005).
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‘civilized’ practices and values of North Atlantic cultures.”18 This section of the paper will
closely examine Plaza’s historic run in Amsterdam in 1928 and the ways it was interpreted by
the Chilean media. To provide context for Plaza’s marathon, we will first look at the race’s
origin story at the Battle of Marathon in 490. From there, we will explore how Plaza came to be
regarded as an ideal model of chilenidad by deconstructing the identity the Chilean media
claimed he represented.
Scholars of both modern and ancient times have a muddled idea of what happened at the
Battle of Marathon in 490, the origin site of a mythological event that inspired the race run
today. The most cited source for uncovering this event is Herodotus, a Greek historian of the
Persian Empire. He details the impending battle between the Persians and Athenians, which led
the Athenians to send a “day-runner,” or hemerodromos in Greek, to Sparta to ask for help. Dayrunners in ancient Greece were trained to run incredibly long distances in order to carry
messages and news. The herald sent by the Athenian general was a hemerodromos by the name
of Pheidippides, although often referred to as Philippides, who ran the 140 miles to Sparta only
for the request to be rejected. In some accounts of the story, Pheidippides ran back to Marathon,
a few sources even claiming that he fought in the battle against the Persians. The story diverges
again when the Athenians are victorious. In the popularized version of the story, Pheidippides
made his final run, for which he is most famous and upon which the marathon race today is
based. This time a forty kilometer (approximately twenty-five mile) trek to Athens, Pheidippides
arrived at the Senate chamber of the city and proclaimed, “Rejoice! We have won,” before
collapsing and dying from exhaustion. This last run to Athens is the least credible part of the
Marathon story, omitted in Herodotus’ recollection and only mentioned centuries later by other

18

Cesar R. Torres, “A Golden Second Place: Manuel Plaza in South America,” Kinesiology, Sport Studies and
Physical Education Faculty Publications of the College at Brockport, State University of New York, 44.
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historians.19 Still, this improbable tale serves as the basis for the 26.2 miles of the modern
marathon.
The main lesson from the Battle of Marathon is not necessarily found in the cold and hard
facts, but in what parts of the story have endured. “That imagery of military and athletic effort –
a citizen fighting to save his people from tyranny and dying in the act of spreading the good
news – has such emotional force that it is tantamount to blasphemy to point out some obvious
historical problems.”20 It is highly unlikely that Pheidippides ran the distance he was canonized
for, but that is beside the point. In a sense, the details and the facts are the least interesting and
least important parts of the story. By stripping down this convoluted story to its most basic form,
the following account remains: A common messenger boy, through an incredible athletic feat,
gave the ultimate sacrifice for his country, and was immortalized for doing so. What
Pheidippides accomplished is less important than what the accomplishment came to represent:
“‘The victory of Greeks over Persians [at Marathon] was the victory of free states over oriental
despotism; it was the victory of a handful of trained athletes over hordes of effeminate
barbarians.’”21 Pheidippides came to represent his country, the Battle of Marathon became an
example of good conquering evil, and the marathon itself transformed into a test of willpower,
perseverance, and heroism. In the context of the 1928 Olympic Games, the mythical origins of
the most iconic event in modern sport entail the delivery of a message. To understand the
meaning of this message, we will apply the same attention to the symbols and imagery that our
modern-day Pheidippides, Manuel Plaza, came to embody in his own story.

19

Stephen G. Miller, Arete: Greek Sports from Ancient Source (University of California Press, 2004) 26.
Donald G. Kyle, Sport and Spectacle in the Ancient World (John Wiley & Sons, 2014) 100.
21
Kyle 207.
20
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The 1928 Marathon
In the 1928 marathon, Plaza patiently stayed in the middle of the pack of runners for the
first half of the race. At mile eighteen, he became an aggressor, chasing down other runners and
claiming a secure spot in the top ten competitors. With just two miles to go, the stage was clearly
set for a showdown between Plaza and Boughera El Ouafi, a member of the French Olympic
contingent. El Ouafi extended his lead, despite Plaza’s attempts to chip away at the growing gap
between them, and finished in first place with a time of 2:32.57. Manuel Plaza finished twentysix seconds later in 2:33.23, followed by the next competitor one minute and thirty-nine seconds
later.22
Plaza had competed in and been successful in many marathons before this one, but the
Olympic factor gave Plaza international visibility and credibility. “In participatory terms, the
World Cup and the Olympics offer a platform to all nations, and most of all to small nations, of
the world that is unrivaled by any other cultural or political body, even the United Nations.”23
Plaza’s medaling at the Olympic stage meant that Plaza and his country were given a global
platform, if only for a short period of time. The event also embedded traits of “Olympism” into
his performance, the philosophy of the Olympics that states that the Games “are contested in a
timeless spirit of amateurism which values taking part above winning and pure sport above
commercial gain.”24 The Chilean media seized this moment, and quickly wove elements of
patriotism and chivalry into every windy turn through the Dutch countryside. By deconstructing
the image that the media painted of Plaza, we will be able to identify the components of

22

David E. Martin and Roger W.H. Gynn, The Marathon Footrace: Performers and Performances (Charles C.
Thomas Publishing, 1939) 98.
23
Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young, “Chapter One - Culture, Politics, and Spectacle in the
Global Sports Event - An Introduction,” National Identity and Global Sports Events (State University of New York
Press, 2006) 2.
24
Stephen Wagg, “Olympism,” Key Concepts in Sports Studies (SAGE, 2009) 152.

Drafts-Johnson 15

chilenidad in this time period, and see how sport was used to communicate the interests and
values of Chile.
The Amateur Ideal
As previously mentioned, sport in Chile in the 1920s was marked by a major conflict
between amateur and professional athletes. This conflict was largely disputed between the
football clubs of the time period, but runners like Plaza were also drawn into the fray. The
amateur ideal was originated in late Victorian/Edwardian Britain, and although it ostensibly
embodied a desire to play for the love of the game, it also served to preserve social
stratification.25 Amateur players were those who could afford to not be paid for their
participation in the sport, and thus were usually wealthy upper-class players. By dividing players
of cricket or fútbol into professional and amateur leagues, Britain avoided socializing lower-class
and upper-class players together. In Chile, amateurism abetted similar goals, in addition to
preventing social mobility for working-class athletes, as we will see in the case of Manuel Plaza.
Plaza was the only distance runner to represent Chile at both the 1924 and 1928
Olympics, despite the fact that at least two other runners in the country could have qualified and
competed at the event. These runners, Martiniano Becerra and Juan Jorquera, were not eligible to
compete because of their status as professional, not amateur, runners.26 Back in Santiago, Plaza
made his living as a suplementero, or a paperboy, a job not unlike the one held by our hero
Pheidippides. Instead of delivering his papers on bicycle, Plaza turned his paper route into a
running workout, delivering newspapers along the way. This amateur status was highlighted in
much of the media coverage following his historic run in the Amsterdam Olympic Games.
Western new outlets used Plaza’s modest profession as an undercutting comment, “‘[i]n the end’

25
26

Martin Johnes, “Amateurism,” The SAGE Dictionary of Sports Studies (SAGE, 2008).
Torres 49.
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El Ouafi “had only to beat another outsider, Miguel [sic] Plaza, the newsboy from Chile.’”27
However, the Chilean media spoke of Plaza’s status as an amateur with great pride. “Plaza’s fans
boasted that ‘one of their own’ had risen to the top of track and field...Plaza became a hero for
working-class youth, who named clubs in his honor and swapped stories of meeting him.”28
Despite the opportunities that professionalism could have offered, Plaza himself was quick to
assure his fellow Chileans of his intent to resume normal life. “‘I received numerous offers to run
in Stockholm and the United States, but I preferred to return as an amateur to my beloved land
where mine and my compatriots are waiting for me.’”29 Plaza clearly understood the need to
commit to an image of amateurism, and was rewarded for this. Amateurism allowed the Chilean
media to imply that Plaza’s endeavor was selfless; he did not run for money or for fame, but for
his country, thus setting the standard for future athletes to do the same.
Per the strict scrutiny of the government and media, Plaza was never able to truly bask in
the rewards of his accomplishment, leaving Amsterdam as a top-finisher in a world class
competition, and returning to Chile as a working-class hero. He could not accept sponsorship
money without fear of being ruled a professional athlete and have his career suffer the same fate
as his idols Becerra and Jorquera.
“After the race Plaza reportedly received lucrative offers to run in Germany, Sweden,
and the United States... Juan Livingstone, the Chilean Olympic chef de mission, dashed
the initial enthusiasm ignited by the prospect of extending Plaza’s international racing
after his Olympic success. Livingstone declared, “On sober consideration, however, this
plan was considered impracticable. That boy [Plaza] must get back at his job of selling
newspapers.’”30
Livingstone’s comments here mark how imperative it was that Manuel return to his day job as a
paperboy. Plaza’s return to Chile marked the restoration of social order and demonstrated the
27

Torres 58.
Elsey 77.
29
Torres 56.
30
Torres 55.
28
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limits to success that members of the working class had as athletes. A working-class athlete
could be afforded opportunity, but only through exceptional diligence and humility, and that
opportunity could only be explored to a certain extent.
Plaza the Gentleman
Chilenidad, as exemplified by Plaza, covers actions as noble as rejecting (deserved)
offers for a professional career in running, to decisions like abstaining from alcohol and calling
home to the family: “The press approvingly reported that during his training in Amsterdam Plaza
never went out after dinner. That he sent greetings to his wife and coach [after the race] was not
lost on the journalists either.”31 Plaza followed the gentleman’s code of conduct during
competition as well. “He was also praised for having looked up Stenroos [his fellow competitor]
after the race to shake his hand…[these comments] categorized him as a gentleman.”32 In many
of the depictions of Plaza’s race, there are even attempts from the Chilean media to re-package
the grueling 26.2 mile endeavor as a gentleman’s stroll in the park. Plaza was said to have run a
calculated and smart race, coming from behind to take second. Post-race, one authority even
claims that just minutes after completing the marathon, Plaza looked, “‘happy, fresh, as if he had
not participated in the formidable race.”33 It is difficult to take these efforts of applying chivalry
and well-mannered conduct to an unforgiving race like the marathon, where anywhere from
thirty to seventy percent of runners typically defecate mid-race.34
In order to understand the racial construction of Plaza in the 1928 marathon, we look to
historian Jorge Larraín. In his book, “Identidad Chilena,” Larraín deconstructs various
interpretations of chilenidad. The first of these is the versión militar-racial, which encompasses
31

Torres 54.
Torres 50.
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Richard N. Fogoros, “‘Runner’s Trots’: Gastrointestinal Disturbances in Runners,” (JAMA Network, 1980) 3.
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a racial theory about Chileans that is rooted in their wars of past. This version of chilenidad
posits that war is central to the Chilean identity: Chile was constructed through conquering the
Mapuche and other indigenous people’s land, again through a war that permitted the
independence of Chile from the Spanish Empire, and finally through the War of the Pacific,
which landlocked Bolivia and granted Chile resource-filled land in the north. Larraín explains
that the racial aspect of this theory arrives when understanding how both war and race require an
“other” to survive.
La versión militar-racial de la identidad chilena es oposicional por excelencia, en el
sentido de que mucho más claramente que otras versiones requiere de un "otro" al que
hay que vencer o derrotar. La guerra implica un enemigo amenazante que hay que
destruir. Una identidad nacional basada en la guerra...se afirma en la necesidad de tener
algún enemigo para destruir. Y no se trata solo de enemigos externos.”35
The military-racial version relies on exclusionary tactics to create this particular definition of
chilenidad. As Larraín hints at above, the “enemies” that chilenidad is in opposition to are not
only external threats like the Peruvians and Bolivians, but the indigenous people of Chile as well.
It is significant that this definition of chilenidad excludes the first people in the geographical
territory that today is Chile, as an estimated ten percent of the population self-identify as
indigenous.36
The undeniably indigenous roots of Chile are often hidden in the country’s projection of
itself internationally. This is apparent in the commentary of the training and performance of
Manuel Plaza. According to the Chilean media, Plaza was a product of European influence on
Chile’s racial stock. A Chilean ambassador to the Vatican “articulated the nation’s elite racial
ideology by praising the positive effect that European immigrants had on Chilean workers,”
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referencing both Plaza’s European ancestry and the fact that Plaza’s coach at the time of his
victory was German-born Carlos Strutz.37 Although Chilean reporters were quick to separate lo
indigeno from lo chileno, reporters from other (particularly, Western) countries were not. Torres
highlights one coverage of the 1928 Amsterdam where this discrepancy is clearly shown.
This was forcefully demonstrated by an exchange between Fanta, the Chilean journalist
and sport official, and some foreign colleagues...As they rode together in the bus
following the race, Fanta recalled being asked about Plaza’s biographical data. The
foreign journalists wondered if Plaza was the son of foreign parents. When Fanta
answered that Plaza was pure Chilean, they concluded: “That means he is Indian.”
Reflecting about the episode, Fanta commented that for “the majority of the journalists it
was a surprise to learn the Chilean race existed.” Implicit in Fanta’s reflection is the
exclusion of the indigenous population from the imagined “Chilean race.” Fanta did not
see any “Indians” in the emergence and consolidation of the “Chilean race” that Plaza
embodied.38
Plaza’s success for the Chilean race and the Chilean race’s impact on Plaza’s success depicts a
reciprocal relationship where each component sustains the other. Plaza was successful because of
his European roots and the impact of European training techniques; his success also revitalizes
the myth that these roots and techniques are superior to others, particularly to indigenous
peoples. The exclusion of the indigenous Chilean from this relationship also implies that the
indigenous population is not to share in Plaza’s victory, as they do not embody the requisite traits
of chilenidad.
National Treasure
The most prominent theme in the chronicles of Plaza’s race is the emphasis on his sense
of patriotic duty. As mentioned before, Plaza’s amateurism indicated that his motives were
“pure” in competing at the Olympics, not for personal financial gain or fame but to represent his
country. In true Olympic spirit fashion, Plaza vowed he would, “‘do everything possible so that
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the Chilean flag will fly from the Olympic mast.’”39 Plaza understood that he was running not
just for himself, but for his country. However, instead of these thoughts weighing him down, he
used them to motivate himself during the competition. Although he was alone in Amsterdam
save for a handful of teammates and government officials, “[Plaza’s] coach recommended that as
Plaza ran the Amsterdam course he pretend that in each tree of the road there is a Chilean that
cheers you, that the spirit is comforted, that he helps you win.’”40 In his own article on this event,
Torres remarks that while these comments appear to be supportive, they also contain an ominous
air of paternalism. “Plaza’s ghostly compatriots were also an omnipresent phenomenon that
would hold him accountable. Imagining Chile, Plaza would be running with and for the nation,
and also under its gaze.”41 The Chileans watching over Plaza’s race remind him that others are
depending upon him to succeed, as his results will reflect on more than just him as an athlete. In
the last kilometers of the race, the director of the Chilean boxing team, Santiago Pérez, urges
Plaza: ““Remember that you are Chilean, Plaza! Run, run!”42 While the “ghostly compatriots”
remind Plaza of the standard of chilenidad that he must strive towards and uphold, Pérez’s
comments also imply that chilenidad is a piece of Plaza’s success; by remembering that he is
Chilean, Plaza will be able to access some kind of strength to assist him in the last leg of the
race.
Plaza’s second place finish on the Olympic stage secured him a spot in the history books
as one of the best Chilean and South American runners of all time. However, he and his medal
were quickly stripped of their individuality as Plaza’s accomplishment came to be shared with
the entire Chilean state and South American continent. This is due in part to the nationalistic
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themes embedded in Plaza’s performance. From Plaza’s promise before the race that the Chilean
flag would be raised, to the patriotic cheers of his teammates during the race, to the efforts of
Chilean and South American media to claim him as their own after the race, Plaza’s identity as a
Chilean and South American athlete is impossible to ignore. La Prensa, a Chilean newspaper,
argued, “Plaza won the silver medal not only for Chile but ‘for the South American
continent.’”43 This desire to label Plaza as Chilean can be explained by understanding what an
Olympic medal signified in the 1920s. Comments that associated Plaza with his nationality
“fused Plaza’s success with that of his nation and conjured up powerful images of sport as a
vehicle for representing the growth of the nation in international arenas and of the role of
politicians as facilitators of that manifestation.”44 By ascribing chilenidad to Plaza’s
performance, it is not only Plaza who wins an Olympic medal, but his country and its people as
well. “Chile” wins silver, “Chile” becomes the production site of one of the best marathon
runners in the world, and “Chile” does all of this with the humility and grace attributed to Plaza.
Manuel Plaza became one of the first Chilean athletes to experience the stardom that
resulted from mass culture in the 1920s, finding himself featured in full-page spreads of
magazines and interviewed by newspapers across the continent.45 Plaza was carefully molded
into the poster-boy for the ideal Chilean in his time period. As an amateur athlete, he modeled
patriotic duty by rejecting a professional career in favor of continuing to represent his country. A
gentleman, he shook his opponents hand and competed with proper sportsmanlike conduct. The
training from his German coach complemented Chile’s European roots, and his dominance over
North American and European runners at the 1928 Games served to bolster Chile’s argument
that they had earned a spot in the globalized world. The silver medal around Plaza’s neck grows
43
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heavy as it becomes charged with more and more meaning, carrying the weight of an entire
country.
Mythical Reflections and a Golden Afterglow
To revisit the story of Manuel Plaza’s predecessor, we will remember that the legend of
Pheidippides emerged centuries after his alleged run from Marathon to Athens, and is omitted
from Herodotus’, the authority on this time period, retelling of the story. Plaza, decades after his
second-place finish in the marathon, also perpetuated a myth of his own: that he lost the race
only because he lost his way. This rumor was sparked after an interview of Plaza with Brava
Brava, a popular sports magazine, in 1943, where Plaza stated, “tomé por un recodo equivocado,
vi que me hicieron señas y volví sobre lo andado, tomando por otro recodo. Había corrido unos
ochenta metros cuando vi que no había más gente. Entonces comprendí que me había
equivocado nuevamente y por segunda vez tuve que retroceder.”46 In other interviews, Plaza is
quoted as saying that he got lost “porque estaba solo, sin entrenador ni masajista” during the
course, whereas other runners had guides.47 A few months before his death, one source even
claims that Plaza declared that, “El Ouafi fue él que acortó el camino.”48 Alleging that a fellow
competitor cheated in competition and scapegoating poor signage on the race course for losing
the race certainly falls short of the gentleman conduct that Plaza was said to have embraced.
Ninety years after Manuel Plaza’s historic run, the gleam of his medal has not dulled. In
fact, it appears to have only gotten brighter. Cesar Torres nicknames this the “goldenization” of
Plaza’s second place finish. To return to our symbols: the Olympic Games represented
modernity, an Olympic medal depicted the ticket to acceptance within Western society, and
Plaza ran as Chile. Thus, Plaza’s silver medal signified much more than the physical hardware
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itself: it marked Chile’s exceptionalism as a Latin American country. In the words of Torres,
“Plaza’s success was coded as a Chilean emblem of progress and modernity, which Chilean
elites thought legitimated their nation in the eyes of the North Atlantic constitutive ‘other.’”49
Through Plaza’s success, Chile lays claim to the characteristics applied to Plaza and his run: his
proper sportsmanship and gentlemanly conduct, his pure commitment to sport and country as an
amateur, and his hereditary superiority as a result of Chile’s European roots. We will now move
past the finish line 1928 marathon and find ourselves several decades in the future, this time on
the fútbol pitch.
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Chapter Two: The Most Disgraceful Match in Fútbol History: Chile vs. Communism
On November 21, 1973, eleven members of the Chilean national fútbol team stood in the
National Stadium in front of some 17,000 spectators and an empty net. Despite this, the whistle
blew and the game began. Ten quick passes were shared between four players, and the gamewinning goal was dribbled into the net by captain Francisco Valdés.50 The thirty-second match
was quickly cut short by the referee, and the team shuffled off the pitch. In the video footage of
the event, the camera slowly zooms into the scoreboard above the field, which read, “La
juventud y el deporte unen Chile hoy,” followed by the score: Copa del Mundo FIFA, Chile: 1
USSR: 0. In this next section, we will examine how one fútbol match came to symbolize
oppression and international disgrace, while simultaneously serving as an endorsement of the
Pinochet regime.
The election of 1970 in Chile saw the world’s first democratically elected socialist leader.
Salvador Allende of the socialist party drew thirty-six percent of the total vote, compared to
thirty-five and twenty-eight percent for the other major party candidates of the election. As
Allende did not win by a majority, the decision was moved to Congress to ratify the results, and
Allende was named president. On September 11, 1973, a U.S.-backed golpe de estado by the
military abruptly ended Allende’s presidency. The socialist leader committed suicide in the
presidential palace, La Moneda, and General Augusto Pinochet took over in what would become
close to eighteen years of dictatorship in Chile.
Pinochet’s dictatorship is remembered for what Pinochet and his regime fought hard to
make others forget. Political enemies of the state and their families were persecuted, tortured,
and murdered. There have been large-scale efforts to recuperate information about the exact
number of those killed or disappeared at the hands of the government during this time, but
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figures still largely vary. The official number of deaths is over three thousand, while the number
of victims of the regime, denoting those who were detained or tortured, hovers in the tens of
thousands.51 This period of time has been scrutinized by many historians, looking at different
forms of resistance to the dictatorship and examining how the 1988 plebiscite was successful in
deposing Pinochet.
As we move from a marathon race to the “great game” of fútbol, we will notice a shift in
the language used to depict the sport and its contests. The reason for this is not particularly
groundbreaking; running and fútbol are simply very different sports. The most obvious
difference is the individual nature of running a race, compared to the team aspect of fútbol.
Successful fútbol demands collaboration, and teams rely on cooperation and communication
within the team in order to function. To some degree, this collaborative aspect requires that a
group of individuals, each with their own talents and beliefs about fútbol, assimilate into one
uniform mind that moves throughout the field. In this section of the thesis, I will draw parallels
between the creation of a cohesive fútbol team and the stratification of Chilean society by the
Pinochet regime. Augusto Pinochet drew clear lines for the Chilean population: you were either
on his team, or against it. By “other”-ing social groups that were in opposition to the regime,
Pinochet was able to rally his supporters under a common goal, the defeat of communism, and
justify the drastic measures taken by his regime. Our attention will then shift to the preliminary
qualifying round for the 1974 World Cup, where Chile was slated to face the USSR. This
controversial match elicited many different responses within Chile as well as in the international
community, and in staying true to our reverence of the messages found in sport, we will examine
the varied interpretations and implications of this game.
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Fair Play and Moral Economies
Athletes do not turn professional for the job security; sport is a volatile thing. Fans are
finicky and fairweather, new coaches bring new strategies and demote the star player to water
boy, and the game evolves faster than the aging bodies of seasoned players. In his article,
“Sports and ‘the Fragility of Goodness,’” scholar Jeffrey Fry discusses the delicate relationship
many athletes share between their sport and their identity: “A life in which sports play a
significant role is a life subject to radical contingency… At extreme ends of the spectrum, we
experience exhilaration, pain, and suffering, ‘the thrill of victory and the agony of defeat.’ This
suggests a direct link between the contingency that pervades sports and the contingency of our
emotional lives.”52
Perhaps because of the insecurity that a life enriched with sport entails, athletes and fans
cling to the parts of the game that they can control. Runners depend on the comforting
uniformity of a 400m track in whatever country or continent they compete in; the interval
between the forty-five minute halves of a fútbol game is a respite that players know they can
count on. When the rules are violated or a competition is perceived as unfair, rage is quick to
surface if justice is not restored. However, sport is not unique in that fairness is expected as a
prerequisite. By comparing the concepts of goodness and fairness in sport with the moral
economies of Chileans during the period of time leading up to the golpe de estado, I will argue
that President Allende’s inability to deliver on basic necessities of life created an environment in
which civilians believed that a stark change in rules, like that brought upon by the golpe de
estado, was justified.
Amidst the chaos of the feet in a fútbol game and the heart-racing panic set off by the gun
in a track meet, there exist written and unwritten rules of each sport that create order on the
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competitive playing field. It is not just the rules of the game that matter, but how those rules are
practiced. “Sport’s educational value, both in ancient and modern times, has been seen as
depending upon sport being practised in a certain manner and with a certain attitude.”53 The chief
governing principle of sport is fairness, a topic investigated by philosopher Sigmund Loland in
his article, “Fair Play: Historical Anachronism or a Topical Ideal?” Opponents, in a fair game,
are dependent on each other’s adherence to the rules of the competition played. However, Loland
points out that many of these rules are not explicitly written, rather fragments of social code that
together build a kind of shared ethos of a sport. In fútbol, for instance, this shared ethos is the
understanding that the ball must be kicked out of play if any player on the field appears injured,
in order for them to receive treatment as soon as possible. A problem arises when “rules” are
subject to the cultural interpretation and context in which a competitor grew up learning about
the game. When these differences come up, players must participate in a negotiation of meaning
for the standards of how the game is played, “to keep our eyes and ears open for the hidden
language expressed through movements, attitudes, and comments among experienced players…
to find our way into ‘the mutually shared field’ or the culture of the game as soon as possible.”54
In order to play a “fair” game, compromises sometimes have to be made on both sides in order to
ensure a cohesive game.
Athletic performances and feats are derived from the desire to achieve specific goals in a
contest. These goals are sometimes intrinsically inspired, and sometimes extrinsically
constructed. Intrinsic goals are the phrases that the NCAA and other big sporting organizations
(who ironically gain more from extrinsically-created motivation) spout – playing for the “love of
the sport” and “the development of sportsmanship and positive societal attitudes” through
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participation in athletics.55 Extrinsic goals include championship titles, breaking records, and
other tangibly explained accomplishments, namely, winning and making money from winning.
Loland explains that a key difference between these two types of goals is fairness.
Internal goals are realized within the very practice of game playing. They take the
character of experiential values such as the excitement of a tight tennis game, the joy of a
well-coordinated attack in soccer, the kinesthetic pleasure of rhythm in a successful race
in alpine skiing. The realization of internal goals depends upon the realization of the
game according to the shared ethos that conceptualizes it. Hence, their realization
presupposes fairness.56
Thus, most internal goals depend upon the cooperation of not only the person attempting to
realize the goals, but the cooperation of the opposition. This is in stark contrast to external goals,
who, “are realized outside the game but depend on the realization of the practice as a means
towards their realization...the wish for prestige and profit. External goals can be realized even if
the holder of such goals does not play according to the relevant ethos. Their realization does not
presuppose fairness.”57 These kinds of goals are built upon the statement of “win at all costs.”
From this analysis of internal versus external goals, we see that players in a game are involved in
a kind of social contract that allows them to actualize their aspirations in a competition.
The kryptonite of this social contract is the presence of cheating or “dirty play” in a
competition. The inclusion of acts that do not adhere to the established rules or shared ethos of a
game can completely interfere with the cooperative aspect of a competition. One player trips or
pulls the jersey of a player on the other team a little too hard, the other team retaliates with an
even harder hit. A player takes advantage of a referee’s blindness to the ball going out of bounds,
and suddenly the entire field is toeing the lines. The dissolution of this shared ethos is not unlike
the concept of moral economies, a political theory that has been used to explain revolutions and
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other unexpected social uprisings. In his essay, “The Concept of ‘Fairness’: Possibilities, Limits,
Possibilities,” Michael Lebowitz reviews the ideas of moral economists E.P. Thompson and
James Scott, who write about the moral economy of the peasant. “Thompson argues that the food
riots… reflect a broad and passionate consensus on what was right, leading to a sharp reaction to
egregious violations of that conception of justice.”58 Lebowitz explains that when a community
has a standard of care and that standard is not met, the community will feel justified in taking
drastic measures in order to regain that standard of care. In his summary of James Scott’s
argument, Lebowitz emphasizes that “conceptions of justice had their roots in the need for
maintaining subsistence rather than opposition to exploitation,” meaning that individuals were
rarely attempting to improve their quality of life, rather defending their current one.59
Moral economy is often discussed as a kind of social contract between peasants and
elites, and the expectation of peasants that they will be protected by the elites they toil for in
times of famine or hardship. It is also similar to the relationship between the people and the state.
The people of a state expect needs to be met, sometimes things as basic as food, water, shelter,
but sometimes ideals that are more complicated to define the completion of: equitable treatment,
protection of civil liberties, and sense of economic and physical security. Politicians are elected
upon the expectation that the policies or values they stand for will fulfill or take steps to fulfill
the needs and wants of the people who elected them. The failure to deliver on these promises can
bring about sharp criticism and action by the people, and result in the expulsion of politicians
from power. For example, political theorists postulate that worker protests in China “‘were
legitimized by [rioters’] belief that they were defending traditional rights or customs that were
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supported by the wider consensus of the community.’”60 In extreme cases, violations of trust by
people in power can bring about drastic change – as exemplified by the golpe de estado in Chile
in 1973.
Allende’s New Game
The election of Salvador Allende brought with it immense hope and expectation, a
dangerous combination for any politician. In campaign speeches, Allende promised social and
economic equality, a complete upheaval of the system that had failed the lower classes for so
long.61 Allende’s goal for his country was not unlike one of the most highly regarded principles
of sport: a level playing field. However, practices like land redistribution and nationalization of
major industries seemed more like robbery than equality to wealthy Chileans and foreign
investors. “The widening reach of Allendes’ revolution horrified well-to-do Chileans, who saw
their property being stolen and their privileges usurped. Fighting back, investors took their
capital abroad...”62 Allende had changed the rules of the game, and those who had succeeded in
the old game were finding that the talents and skills they had honed for years would do them no
good in the new socialist regime.
Allende understood that his revolution would shock his citizens and the world, and in his
first Parliamentary address, he asked for patience during the tumultuous times that were sure to
come: “A social and economic revolution takes years. Time is necessary for the conscience of
the masses to be penetrated, for new structures to be organised and made operable as well as to
be adapted to the existing ones. It is sheer utopianism to imagine that the intermediary stages can
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be skipped.”63 These “intermediary stages” dragged into overtime as the socialism fought to keep
pace with the needs of Chilean citizens. Chileans were not prepared for the conditioning that
Allende’s new policies required; after a slow marathon pace of waiting for change, they came
into the revolution expecting a short sprint to the finish line that promised equality. But both
domestic and foreign interference battered the legitimacy of Allende’s socialist strategy.
“Truckers fomented strikes that created shortages of staple goods and fueled the black market.
Right-wing ‘shock troops’ like Patria y Libertad blew up electrical towers and vandalized
factories to heighten the climate of tension and fear.”64 Years after the military coup, declassified
U.S. government documents revealed which side the Land of Liberty had chosen. The U.S. had
covertly funneled money into the campaign of Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat who preceded
Allende’s presidency, in order to prevent the spread of socialism. When Allende was finally
elected, President Nixon was quoted telling foreign policy aides to “‘make the Chilean economy
scream,’” decreasing foreign aid given to the country and withdrawing investments in Chilean
companies.65
In the years that followed Allende’s inauguration, Chile was ostracized by the
increasingly neoliberal and globalized world. Allende’s administration responded to shortages
and deficits by creating rationing committees known as Price and Supply Boards. Citizens were
forced to wait in line for hours to get food, increasing the already anxious climate of the country.
This deprivation to basic needs sparked the already seething resentment as Chileans adjusted to
the changes of the new political regime. “Carmen García, a mother of four from working-class
Lo Prado, wept as she remembered having to ‘stand all night in the cold to get milk for the
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baby...I will never, ever forgive the Communists for that.’”66 The U.S. and right-wing Chilean
groups eagerly deepened the divides that began to wedge themselves into society, spreading
rumors of Communist plots to exterminate opposition, driving up prices of food, and gouging the
prices of goods on the ever-expanding black market.67 The chaos within the country had reached
a breaking point in the fall of 1973, and military rule to many seemed like a viable option.
Sportscasters and coaches have a bad habit of conflating the language of sport and the
language of war. The two are obviously interchangeable when talking strategy: who is on
“offense,” who is on “defense,” what is the “battle plan” of the day, or how to prepare for
“attacks” from the other side. After the games, “coaches/generals publicly glory in their
victories, lament their defeats, and mourn their casualties.”68 This mixing of sportspeak and
warspeak bleeds into the political rhetoric as well, seen in the language used by various U.S.
presidents’ speeches about both the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars.69 There are understandable
reasons to use sport metaphors to explain war: “…with the decline of competing, shared objects
of reverence…sports heroes and paradigmatic and memorable sporting events known throughout
a nation provide some of the ‘few cohesive aesthetics’ with which people (and especially men)
connect to the social body as a whole.”70 Sportspeak allows politicians to discuss difficult topics
like war in contextualized and relatable ways. As the population of churchgoers dwindles,
sportspeak is an accessible way to inform the population about “non-sporting matters, since
today ‘the average citizen arguably can be more easily summoned and engaged by sports talk
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than by religious or God talk.’”71 Conversely, warspeak benefits the goals of coaches to motivate
their teams. By labeling the opposing team as “the enemy,” coaches are able to unify their team
members against a shared threat. Comparing sport competitions to a literal battlefield raises the
stakes and heightens a team’s urgency for victory. Augusto Pinochet, an avid sports fan himself,
utilized both warspeak and sportspeak in order to create divisions within the Chilean civilian
populations. In the next section, we will review how sportspeak and warspeak were used to
demonize political enemies of the state.
Politics as Fútbol
After the 1973 golpe de estado, the military regime quickly drew a game plan for the
future of Chile. Pinochet heavily relied on setting different segments of the population against
each other in order to justify the drastic measures taken by his regime. The overarching battle
was most clear for Chilean citizens: you were either with Chile, or against it. However, Pinochet
also carefully fractured the interactions between the general civilian population and Chileans
who served in the military, blaming the greed of non-military citizens for the downfall of
democracy and the rise of socialism. “In segregated housing complexes, military families
socialized almost exclusively with each other and nursed their prejudices against the civilian elite
that had turned politics into a national sport.”72 Military personnel were told that the leftist
resistance groups had stockpiled arms to fight back after the coup, instilling fear within the
military ranks that was then taken out on civilians. Chileans who supported the former Allende
government were likened to an enemy at war. One former military official explains:
“‘What [our officers] said created great anxiety and mistrust among us; it created the
desire to go out and kill those animals...This explains the transformation of an army that
respected civilian leadership into one that could treat prisoners like the Vietnamese.

71
72

Jenkins 246.
Constable and Valenzuela 45.

Drafts-Johnson 34

Anyone who acted with humanity was a traitor. Anyone who supported the [Allende]
government was serving a foreign enemy.’”73
By painting the civilians as the enemy, Pinochet and his aides ensured cooperation from the
military when rounding up political enemies. The enemies of Pinochet were the enemies of the
people, and any competitive athlete knows that you never cheer for the rival team. With
thousands of dissenting voices silenced, either disappeared or murdered, Pinochet made it
difficult to join the other side.
Inciting hatred between the home and away team is integral to many coaches’ strategies,
but uniting a team is also important for a team to function successfully. Pinochet recognized this,
and took steps to unify the country under the best mascot he could think of: himself. In 1977, just
four years after taking power, President Pinochet was already under fire from the United Nations
for violations of human rights. After the UN voted to condemn Chile for human rights abuses by
a vote of 96 to 14, Pinochet called for a national referendum to demonstrate that his people
supported the military regime.74 This decree was subject to heavy criticism from Pinochet’s
aides, but rushed through all the same. “At the polls on January 4, 1978, voters were handed a
ballot with a Chilean flag for ‘yes,’ and a black box for ‘no,’ in answer to the following
statement: ‘Faced with international aggression launched against our fatherland, I support
President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile and reaffirm the legitimacy of the
government...’”75 The obvious appeals to patriotism, a Chilean flag marking the “right” answer,
urged countrymen to vote in accordance with their national allegiance.
General Pinochet was fond of stripping away nuance and complexity. The
aforementioned ballot options were simple “yes” or “no” answers, with no room to argue or
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explain a decision. Pinochet continued with this line of direct questioning in future electoral
votes. Eager to secure his position as president for the probable future, Pinochet pushed for a
new Constitution, which included a provision ensuring eight more years of military rule before
another plebiscite to renew Pinochet’s term. On September 11, 1980, a national referendum was
put on the ballot: “‘New Political Constitution: Yes or No.’”76 After the constitution was passed,
Pinochet immediately linked the passing of the Constitution to a victory for the entire country.
“‘For a second time, we have defeated the totalitarians! ...We have shown the world how
democratic this nation is, that it needs no one to come give it lessons.’”77 Comments like these
are similar to the sport to war and war to sport imagery employed by coaches and politicians.
The referendum was more than a simple vote, it was a time to swear loyalty to the country, and
created a “Chile against the world” mindset.
The linkage between Pinochet, the regime, and the country made protests difficult for the
resistance groups forming. Pinochet had made his name synonymous with Chile, thus opposition
to the dictator also implied treason to the country. For the 1988 plebiscite that would decide if
Pinochet would lead for the next eight years, the ballot again read “yes” or “no.” The campaign
from the military regime used slogans like “Chile sí,” a hard slogan to vote against. However, the
“No” campaign managed to co-opt the statement by expanding it: “Chile sí, junta no,” read the
opposition banners.78 Here we see the difficulty encountered by the groups resisting the military
regime; in order to defeat Pinochet, they first needed to separate him from the nationalistic
tapestry he had woven. In the same way that Pinochet had banished leftists from the Chilean
identity, his opposition now had to fight to exclude Pinochet from la chilenidad as well.
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It may seem like a trite comparison, likening a murderous dictator to an overly ambitious
fútbol coach, but the fact remains that Pinochet understood how valuable sport and its
accompanying ideologies could be for his regime. He rallied his team under the Chilean flag,
using the rhetoric of war to draw lines between the homeland and the opposition: Marxism.
Forget running suicides or staying late to do extra drills – those who disagreed with him were
completely kicked out of the game, although they often still ended up in a stadium. He cozied up
to the referees, who often came from the United States, and he and his players evaded the
dreaded yellow and red cards for years. Pinochet was a poor sport, though. When he found
himself losing, the General would change the rules of the game completely in order to regain
advantage, whether that meant creating a new Chilean constitution or stuffing the ballot boxes in
the latest plebiscite. Despite all the changes that Chile underwent during the Pinochet regime,
fútbol remained virtually unchanged, at least on the surface, to the Chilean public. One
prominent fútbol player at the time explains, “...in declassified documents it was later revealed
that, soon after taking power, Pinochet had ordered football to be left alone. He understood that
football was immensely popular and messing with it would be a measure that attacked
football.”79 This does not mean that fútbol was safe from being used as a tool by the dictatorship.
In the 1974 World Cup, we will observe how Pinochet leveraged fútbol’s popularity and history
in Chile in order to propagate the functionality of his regime at an international scale.
Fútbol as Politics
The cultural significance of fútbol in Chile, and Latin America, is not to be
underestimated. In “Del Chile de los triunfos morales al ‘Chile, país ganador,’” Diego Vilches
Parra, a scholar of la Universidad de la Serena in Chile, explains the connection between fútbol
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and country. “Aunque comúnmente se asume que es la identidad del país la que se expresa en
una determinada forma de practicar el fútbol, lo cierto es que la identidad chilena sólo se expresa
a través de este deporte en la medida en que existe un discurso que le da un significado nacional
e identitario.”80 Fútbol inherently does not have meaning, in the same way that a bald eagle
(although perhaps a condor would be a more fitting example) does not inherently possess
qualities of freedom or bravery. However, it is the meaning that we ascribe to these symbols –
the bald eagle as the national bird for a country that claims to be home to the free and the brave –
that gives these symbols their weight.
Eduardo Galeano’s poetic meditation, Soccer in Sun and Shadow, illuminates how soccer
has come to play such a large role in the identity of different Latin American countries. Galeano
refers to fútbol as a part of the “English Invasions,” emphasizing the colonial roots of the sport.81
However, fútbol was quickly picked up on the South American continent. Chile, alongside
Argentina, was the first of the South American countries to join FIFA, the International
Federation of Association Football, in 1912.82 This European ancestry is not unlike the heritage
emphasized in the previous section about the racial stock of Manuel Plaza. As a result of its
European roots, fútbol has always held a significant degree of weight as a “civilized” or
“Western” sport. Being good at fútbol also communicates a message. “Al ser una manifestación
típica de la cultura contemporánea, el fútbol es considerado como una expresión propia de las
sociedades más desarrolladas.”83 A country with a strong fútbol team denotes strength in other
areas for the country, which explains why so much government money, attention, and support is
often into funneled mega-events like the Olympics and World Cup.
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Because fútbol captures so much attention, it is often used as a political tool. And as the
most popular sport on the Latin American continent, fútbol is also one of the quickest routes to
the heart of a countryman. Galeano puts it best, saying, “soccer and fatherland are always
connected, and politicians and dictators frequently exploit those links of identity.”84 President
Medici famously exploited the results of the 1970 World Cup, using Brazil’s victory as a way to
legitimize his government.85 Similarly, the 1978 World Cup “allowed Argentina’s generals to
obfuscate the regime’s horrific record of disappearances, systematic torture, and widespread
human rights violations.”86 In La Paz, the Bolivian government used the “bread and circus”
technique, attempting to distract labor unions from a planned strike by organizing a game against
the successful Argentinian team.87 Particularly in times of political unrest, the limelight and
prestige of the World Cup allows countries a unique opportunity to showcase not only their
fútbol talent, but also their patriotism. For this reason, the timing of the 1974 World Cup, less
than a year after Chile’s military coup, appeared as a highly contested venue to disseminate ideas
about the country under its new government.
Chile did not receive much international acclaim for its fútbol team in the twentieth
century, instead relying on “moral victories” in place of actual wins. Diego Vilches explains the
transition that took place in his essay, “Del Chile de los triunfos morales al ‘Chile, país ganador’.
La identidad nacional y la selección chilena de fútbol durante la Dictadura Militar (1973-1989).”
Vilches explains that the Chilean press depicted the national team as Chilean press frequently
“mostró el choque deportivo ante rivales europeos como la lucha bíblica entre David y Goliat.”88
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This analogy uses David as Chile, the underdog whose wit and devotion to God allow him to
overcome Goliath, representative of the more-developed, but immoral and godless, countries.
With patience and adherence to goodness, this analogy promises that Chile will be the country
chosen by God to prevail. By highlighting the sportsmanlike conduct and perseverance of the
national team, Chile’s losses are never really losses, just steps on the path to their ordained
victory.
Just fifteen days after the military coup, Chile-David took on a new Goliath: communism.
Chile’s national team was slated to compete in Moscow against the Soviet Union, in a playoff
game for the 1974 World Cup. General Augusto Pinochet had severed ties with communist
countries that shared the same ideals as Salvador Allende, and so Chile and the USSR quickly
went from “ideological comrades to bitter enemies.”89 This kind of juxtaposition quickly
politicized the game: it was no longer just Chile against the Soviet Union, but neoliberalism
against communism. The game would determine which ideology was superior, and would also
stand to potentially legitimize the Pinochet regime if the Chilean team was victorious. “Entre
septiembre de 1973 y julio de 1974, la selección chilena de fútbol se convirtió en el símbolo de
un Chile-David que enfrentaba al Comunismo-Goliat.”90 At the first contest in Moscow, the
match ended in a draw, 0-0. Despite this anti-climactic result, the Chilean press still ran the
headline, “The Soviet Union couldn’t even beat us at football,” capitalizing on any kind of
shortcoming from the USSR that they could.91
The subsequent play-off game was set for the National Stadium in Santiago, Chile. This
location choice was immediately swarmed with controversy. At the time, there were whispers
and rumors of the horrors happening within the stadium, but it is now well-documented that the
89
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National Stadium was converted into a torture and detainment center by the Pinochet regime
immediately following the September 11th coup. To the USSR, playing a game in a stadium
“stained with blood” would signify the USSR’s acquiescence to Pinochet’s treatment of their
left-ist Chilean comrades.92 The USSR demanded that the match be played in neutral territory.
However, it quickly became clear that this game was going to be anything but neutral. To play in
the stadium would dismiss the rumors of human rights violations in Chile; to play in a different
venue would suggest the rumors were true.
FIFA was clearly uncomfortable being thrust into this suddenly intensely political
situation, and their attempts to remain apolitical turned out decisively in favor of the Pinochet
regime. For the duration of the stadium inspection, the FIFA delegation was “put up in one of the
capital's finest hotels and provided with a chauffeur-driven limousine.”93 Perhaps these unsubtle
attempts at bribery are why the FIFA officials did not question the suspicious explanation for the
stadium’s present state, perhaps FIFA simply did not want to deal with the responsibility that the
truth would require. In any case, the official FIFA report unconvincingly dismisses the idea of
the stadium as unfit for a World Cup game:
The stadium is at present being used as a 'clearing station' and the people in there are not
prisoners but only detainees whose identity has to be established (a large number of
foreigners without valid documents)...The stadium is under military guard and entry is
only with a special pass. Inside the outer fencing everything seemed to be normal and
gardeners are working on the gardens. Inside the stadium itself the seats and pitch were
empty and the remaining detainees were in the dressing and other rooms. The grass on
the pitch is in perfect condition as were the seating arrangements.94
Like a parent settling a squirmish between two unruly children, FIFA unceremoniously ended the
debate on the match’s location. “Based on what [our contingent] saw and heard in Santiago, life
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is back to normal and the guarantees given by the government are such that the World Cup
Preliminary match Chile vs. USSR can be carried out...”95 This document, which cited “life as
back to normal” in Chile, was one of the first official documents to come out about Pinochet’s
Chile. This report gave Chile the rubber-stamp seal of approval of a powerful international
institution, and despite FIFA’s claims of neutrality, clearly picked a side.
The coverage of this event within Chile attempted to shield the Chilean public from the
accusatory glares of the rest of the world. When the USSR first protested the event, the Chilean
press returned to their argument of the moral duties in fútbol. “Chile andaba cumpliendo sus
compromisos deportivos,” whereas the USSR had failed to fulfill their own duties by boycotting
the event.96 The Chilean newspapers following the match also implied that the whole of Chile
was under attack by the USSR’s refusal to play. “Chile puede ser ‘un país pequeño,
subdesarrollado, pero en materia de dignidad no nos vienen a dar lecciones, menos en el
deporte.’”97 This encouraged Chileans to personally take offense to the charges of the USSR,
creating an us vs. them dynamic that implicated not just the Pinochet regime but the whole of
Chile. Proponents of Pinochet strove to brand this game as an example of Chilean resilience in
the face of the international community, which at the time was sharply critical of what was
allegedly happening under the new regime.
Years after the Chile vs. USSR match, the fútbol players who played in the game were
finally able to speak out about their experience and the impact they saw from the match. Carlos
Caszely, Chile’s star striker, was one of the most outspoken members of the team in opposition
to the dictatorship. His recollection of the game is one of shame. “‘That team did the most
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ridiculous thing in history. It was a worldwide embarrassment.’”98 His teammate, Leonardo
Véliz, shares his sentiment. “‘Imagine what I was feeling going into that stadium for one of the
most risible games in football history, it was an absolutely disgraceful match that should never
have taken place... What were those people watching thinking? Perhaps they had come to laugh
at us.’”99 The feelings of these fútbolistas may derive from the fact that playing in the match
allowed the dictatorship to use the World Cup match as propaganda to the outside world. One of
the captives of the regime, Jorge Montealegre, recalls the impact of this match taking place. "The
eyes of the world were on Chile...this symbol of a stadium turned into a concentration camp was
like the worst propaganda for the dictatorship. That awful image went around the world, and the
stadium became a metaphor for Chile's dictatorship."100 Playing a game in the National Stadium
allowed the Pinochet regime to literally broadcast images that directly contradicted the rumors of
torture and detainment.
The publicity that the World Cup game gave Chile did not convince everyone in the
international community, but there was little opposition to Chile’s decision to play in the game.
“Por lo tanto la clasificación como la participación en el Mundial fueron interpretadas como un
enorme triunfo moral, en circunstancias que para el resto del mundo Chile eran sinónimo de
dictadura y violación de los derechos humanos.”101 In some ways, the game demonstrated the
lengths that the Pinochet regime was willing to go in order to cover up what was happening.
Although Chile did begin to receive pressure from international solidarity groups to explain the
disappearances and deaths that were taking place, the terrain of fútbol remained strangely devoid
of criticism. FIFA, as with their ruling on the Stadium’s state, continued to refuse to comment on
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its stance towards the military junta: “‘We are not concerned with politics or what regimes are
ruling a country...all we want to know is whether playing conditions are right.’”102 Some
international papers even criticized the Soviet Union’s decision, saying the boycott had created a
“‘painful abscess’” for the Cup.103 In FIFA’s official technical study of the match, the USSR
controversy is not even mentioned. Renowned journalist Eduardo Galeano went on to call
Chile’s performance “the most pathetic match in the history of soccer,” and although this was
likely the viewpoint of many spectators around the world, the match received little ethical
debate.104 This lack of immediate outcry points to a common phenomenon in the sport world: the
desire for sport to remain apolitical. However, the absence of a clear stance against the match
instead simply left the Pinochet regime uncriticized and unchecked. Silence sends just as
powerful a message as noise does, and the general quiet of the international community in 1973
condoned the actions of the Chilean military regime.
The Chilean team sent to the World Cup in 1974 were under an unbelievable amount of
pressure from both the military regime, as well as their fans and compatriots. After qualifying in
such an unorthodox manner, the team needed to defend their place at the competition. They also
served as some of the only ambassadors of Chile to the outside world at this time, and faced such
questioning about the political situation in Chile that the players began to charge money for
interviews.105 Instead of inferring that the players’ silence could have stemmed from fear for
their personal safety or families, journalists “interpreted this as economic opportunism on the
part of the players.”106 It was later revealed that several fútbol players were threatened and even
imprisoned by the regime, like Hugo Lepe, a defender on the team. Families were also at risk at
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this time. Carlos Caszely’s mother was detained and tortured by the military, and in the final
years of the dictatorship was able to employ her son’s celebrity to speak out against her captors.
At the time of World Cup, though, the players were only able to play defense – treading
carefully with the military regime and on the field.
“Chile were almost totally committed to defence, attempting their attacks by brief counter
moves through Arias and Garcia. The tackling by the Chilean players became more
desperate as the game went on and, after Caszely had been sent off for an unfair
retaliatory tackle, the Chileans had to concentrate even more on defence to keep the score
down with Figueroa and Quintano playing extremely well...Chile's defensive style could
not quite win through against the strong European teams.”107
As the FIFA technical study states, Chile failed to score a single goal in the World Cup, their
defensive strategies only successful in keeping the score down. Caszely received the first
physical red card in the history of fútbol, a fitting award for the only member of the team to
openly defy Pinochet, refusing to shake the general’s hand in the team’s send-off ceremony.108
Caszely was accused by sportswriters and fans in Chile of self-sabotage, the red card a deliberate
rejection of his duty to his country and his team. Years after the World Cup, Caszely was
confronted by General Pinochet at a banquet where, “Chile’s leader criticised the player’s red tie,
the colour synonymous with communism, making a motion with his fingers that he was about to
cut it. ‘You may do it,’ Caszely remarked, ‘but my heart will forever remain red.’”109 Ultimately,
the Chilean national team, ironically nicknamed “La Roja,” failed to demonstrate Chile’s alleged
newfound strength as a country under the new regime, their scoreless World Cup run ending with
elimination in the first round.
Despite the national team’s lackluster performance in the World Cup, print media in
Chile still sought to find the silver lining in terms of moral victory.
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“El Mundial fue considerado como ‘importante pero sólo como calibrador de nuestra
potencia actual.’ Es que ‘ni la vida ni la patria ni el honor están involucrados en una
derrota [...] ganar, perder, son contingencias transitorias. Ser íntegros, rectos y leales va
más allá de la transitoriedad.’ De esa manera, un resultado mediocre fue caracterizado
como una actuación decorosa y digna, refejo del progreso del fútbol en un Chile
subdesarrollado.”110
After all, Chile had confronted its Communist-Goliath, the USSR, and won. Their participation
in the World Cup was indicative of their future potential not only as a soccer team, but as a
country. The rest of the 1970s gave way to drastic changes in economic policy, with the
installment of neoliberal market practices under the influence of the Chicago Boys. With these
changes in economic policy came new ideas about the central identity of Chileans.
In the previous chapter, we discussed one interpretation of chilenidad from Jorge
Larraín’s book “Identidad Chilena.” As we move on to the time period of 1973 through 1988, we
return to Larraín’s theories on the type of chilenidad developing at this time. This strain of
chilenidad is referred to as “La versión empresarial postmoderna,” and it represents a change in
tone in the Chilean narrative as Chile struggles to distinguish itself from its Latin American
neighbors and establish itself as a “winning country.” Three specific ideas are present in this
version of chilenidad:
“La primera idea intentaba presentar a Chile como un país diferente al resto de
América Latina, un país frio y de rasgos europeos, que difiere de los tropicalismos de
otros países de la región y que ha superado un pasado pre moderno. La segunda idea
mostraba una actitud dinámica y triunfalista cimentada en los triunfos económicos
logrados. La tercera idea mostraba a Chile como un país eficiente que crece y se
desarrolla aceleradamente.”111
This threefold definition covers several themes: cultural identity, economic success, and
modernity. This version of chilenidad developed alongside the installment of neoliberal ideals in
Chile and the increasingly globalized world. In the midst of many changes to the international
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sphere, Chile is struggling to redefine itself as well. As the concept of what is chilenidad
changes, so do the values of this brand of Chile. ““Implícita en este nuevo discurso, hay una
nueva concepción cultural que destaca el empuje, el dinamismo, el éxito, la ganancia y el
consumo como los nuevos valores centrales de la sociedad chilena.”112 These new values come
to shape not just the economy and labor dynamics in Chile, but how sports are played as well.
With these new values come an entire re-branding of Chile: “Chile país diferente, Chile país
ganador y Chile país moderno” are just a few of the campaigns used abroad by Chile as it begins
to define itself in this new way.
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Epilogue: The National Stadium
“Stade: In French, the word for stadium, deriving from the name—stadion—for the basic
running race that was held at the ancient Olympic Games. The distance of that race was a
single length of the stadium, and the name of the race was derived from the word for stadium.
From that quintessential athletic event, the word has come to refer to sites of and facilities for
performative events of many types, in world settings. See also OLYMPIC GAMES,
ANCIENT.”113
-

From Alan Tomlinson, Oxford Dictionary of Sports Studies
It is a pity that stadiums cannot speak. Now approaching her eightieth birthday, the

National Stadium in Chile is longing to resolve the multiple identity crises suffered in her early
adulthood. The stadium has never been treated well by her country. A child of Arturo
Alessandri’s second marriage into the presidency, she was born in 1938 and welcomed into the
world with the hisses and boos of the Chilean people, who protested her very creation. President
Alessandri conceived of the stadium in his meetings with the Liberal Party of Chile, who sought
to win over the middle class by demonstrating their investment in public infrastructure, as well as
the sport cherished by working-class Chileans. Despite concerns over the cost and accessibility
of the stadium, once the proposal was approved a fierce custody battle quickly ensued.
The neighborhood associations of Santiago presented their bids to Congress to have the
stadium born and raised in their districts. The historically impoverished districts of Maipu and
Renca emerged with some of the strongest propositions, hoping the birth of a monumental,
government-backed structure would revitalize their communities.114 However, in the first of
many political decisions made about the stadium that overlooked the will of the public, President
Alessandri issued an executive order to build the stadium in Ñuñoa, one of the wealthier districts
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in Santiago. This sparked outrage on many levels, but most notably in that the stadium would be
directly across from Alessandri’s family property, and that the construction of the new stadium
necessitated the destruction of one of the biggest sport complexes in Chile at the time, Campos
de Sport de Ñuñoa.115
The National Stadium’s heritage continued to be muddled with further controversy. The
architect appointed to assist in her construction, Ricardo Müller Hess, based his plans off of the
stadium used for the Berlin Olympic Games of 1936. This German stadium’s father later went on
to commit one of the largest genocides in human history. The childhood of Chile’s stadium was
marred with neglect and lies. She was never complete – not on her opening day in 1938, not after
efforts to finish her building in time for the 1962 World Cup, and not even after the extensive
remodeling attempts of Michelle Bachelet in 2009.116 Despite this, the stadium did all she was
ever asked to do. She was a gracious hostess to whoever came kicking at her door, be it the
prestigious national team, La Roja, or the plucky amateur squads who managed to steal a few
practice sessions in her home. She echoed the noises of delight of the crowd as Carlos Caszely
scored goal after goal in game after game; she reverberated the discordant silence as Victor
Jara’s body hung lifelessly at her entrance.
Jara’s murder was not the first that marked the stadium’s defilement by the Pinochet
regime. After the military coup of 1973, the stadium was invaded in masse, in order to hold the
political prisoners of the right-wing government. The stadium had never complained when the
fans of Colo-Colo or La Roja spilled their beer and completos on her seats. But she did not know
what to do with the blood, the tears, and the cries of anguish that now seeped into her wooden
stands and fermented under her concrete tunnels. An estimated 10,000 prisoners were held in the
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stadium in the fifty-eight days that Pinochet converted the national site of soccer into a
concentration camp. The truth commission lists forty-one deaths that took place inside the
stadium; human rights groups believe the number is likely in the hundreds.117 The stadium
thought back to the custody battles, when she was little more than idle construction material and
blueprints on a page. How the people had desperately fought to have her, a place that was now
more like Auschwitz than La Bombonera, in their own backyard.
It is a pity that stadiums cannot speak. For all of the emotion that she absorbed, from the
excited yells of diehard fans to the anguished screams of accused communists, the stadium was
silent the day that the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) arrived. The
prisoners were hidden in her depths or sent away to the dry Atacama in the north, and between
sips of Chile’s oldest and finest signature wines, the inspectors declared the stadium fit to host
the qualifying match between Chile and the USSR for the 1974 World Cup. The stadium
watched ashamedly alongside the collection of spectators that had shown up for the national
team as they faced an empty net. The Chilean players slowly approached the net with a short
series of passes more reminiscent of hot potato than fútbol, as if each second of contact made
them more culpable in the dictatorship’s farce of a game.
Today, the stadium still stands in Ñuñoa, hosting soccer games, track and field
competitions, and ferias for las Fiestas Patrias. She remains as complicated a symbol as ever. Her
conception is remembered as a time of hope, when the budding fútbol clubs of Santiago received
Alessandri’s promise of a stadium as a marker of “progress, nationalism, and modernization of
the country.”118 Her birth highlighted the turn from the populist style of politics to socialist
appeals to the people, who were dismayed by practices of the Alessandri administration and the
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immense deficit left from the stadium’s creation.119 The stadium went on to become a pawn of
the dictatorship, whose image was shown throughout the world in the 1973 match between Chile
and the no-show USSR team to demonstrate that Chile was fine, the rumors of human rights
violations nothing more than vicious, international gossip.
Now, the stadium sits and attempts to be the best stadium that she can be given her past.
To some, she has become a place of “catharsis...a place to scream to the heavens, to howl at
injustice, and feel a moment of supreme satisfaction.”120 To others, the stadium is a place of
remembrance. Modern-day spectators who visit her will notice a small row of wooden bleachers
that stand out against the red, remodeled seats, behind the northern goalpost of the stadium.
Underneath the stands is a small museum that exhibits photos and names of those murdered or
disappeared, former prisoners of the Pinochet regime.121 The emptiness of the wooden bleachers
is purposeful, designated to stay forever unoccupied in deference for those who never left the
stadium.
Fútbol’s importance to South American identity formation has in turn endowed the
stadiums that house the sport with the same influence. Historian Josh Nadel, in an interview
about his book, “Fútbol! Why Soccer Matters in Latin America,” argues that, “soccer clubs and
stadiums acted as spaces where Latin American societies could grapple with the complexities of
nationhood, citizenship, politics, gender, and race.”122 Chile’s National Stadium, as seen through
the multiple roles she held in the above chronology of her lifespan, serves as an excellent
example for Nadel’s claim. On the National Stadium’s opening day, a Chilean paper ran an
article about the significance of Chile’s newest staging arena:
119

Elsey 90
Dan Zirin, Welcome to the Terrordome: The Pain, Politics and Promise of Sport (Haymarket Books, 2007) 84.
121
David Waldstein, “In Chile’s National Stadium, Dark Past Shadows Copa América Matches,” (New York Times,
2015).
122
Joshua Nadel, “Futbol! Soccer History and Politics in Latin America,” The Kojo Nnamdi Show (2014).
120

Drafts-Johnson 51

“The National Stadium has greatness. And we are not referring to its large size, but to the
majesty that springs from its whole form, to the suggestiveness that surrounds its vast
stands, to the ambitious lines that open to host immense crowds. The athletes that enter it
will feel the weight of its dominion and the emotion of its strength. As figures grow when
they stand out against the evening sky, athletes in the Stadium will feel examined under a
magnifying glass, as if standing on a pedestal. The spacious construction multiplies the
importance of the sporting spectacle. It ennobles, heightens, provides peak sensations.”123
After probing the meaning of Manuel Plaza’s marathon run and scrutinizing the depictions of the
national Chilean fútbol team in 1973 and 1974, the highly symbolic National Stadium feels like
the appropriate spot to sit and reflect on the idea of contested meanings. Did Plaza feel the
weight of the medal around his neck, and understand the burdens placed on him as the
ambassador for not only his country, but amateurism and gentility? Did the eleven jugadores on
the field November 22, 1973, know the impact that their thirty-second game would have? It is
likely that none of these athletes ever desired the controversy and chatter that their performances
would generate, but they made their marks on history all the same.
This paper has shown how sport can prop up dangerous people and their ideologies,
support racial elitism and preserve social class constraints, and physically serve as a holding
ground and torture center for innocent civilians. Yet still, adoring fans will flock to the big game
on Sunday afternoon, buy jerseys from the corrupt corporations, and send their children to
basketball camp with the hopes of improving their jump shot and their moral compass. Perhaps
the zero-sum nature of most sports is what calls people to make blanket and definitive statements
about them. Sport is neither good nor bad; sport simply is, and its prevalence as a cultural
activity demands that it be scoured and studied in order to learn from the performances it so
graciously showcases. The wise student will “avoid the uniformed tirades of the anti-sport lobby

123

Krause 64.

Drafts-Johnson 52

and often naive and idealistic accounts of pro-sports devotees,” and instead embrace the
contested battleground that sport holds.124
From marathons to fútbol games and race tracks to stadiums sport has served as a venue
to express ideas about identity and ideology. It is not unlike any other cultural activity in its
importance or its fallibility, so that the task:
“...is to examine sport as a form of cultural struggle, resistance, and politics whilst
recognizing that it is also compromised by forms of commodification, commercialization,
and bureaucratic control... to consider sport as an embodied art form that is formed in
relation to both intrinsic and extrinsic goals and rewards that sometimes over-determine
the stated aims of the participants.”125
Sport, when treated with the value given to any other cultural artifact, will yield its secrets to the
curious investigator – we only need to ask.
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